Introduction
Inequality and poverty measurement share a common ancestry. Many economists and other social scientists are generally aware of this but, if pressed, are not too sure about what the exact dynastic connections are. The aim of this chapter is to explain a little of the "who is related to whom" and to distinguish some of the main family traits.
However, we will be thinking about close family only. We will not be going into some of the interesting further relations with deprivation, affluence, polarisation concentration and so on; the chapter will not attempt to provide a comprehensive survey; 1 nor will we be going beyond income-related inequality and poverty (although the definition of "income" can be stretched a bit). Furthermore the chapter confines itself to the problems of measurement only. So we will not be taking a detour to examine the interesting recent evidence on inequality and poverty trends in particular countries nor will we be looking at the many important questions that arise in the practical implementation of the measures -the statistical issues of estimation and inference.
As can be seen by scanning the headings below we shall devote rather more time to inequality than to poverty. There are two good reasons for this: many of the important abstract concepts were worked out first in the inequality context and then extended to the formal analysis of poverty; furthermore many of these abstract concepts are, in my opinion, more appropriate in the inequality context. We begin with some explanation of terms.
A framework
For most of the time we will consider a society consisting of a fixed population. So, we assume that there are n persons, each with an identifiable and observable income. Each person i's income is represented by a real number x i that tells us all that we need to know about the individual in the inequality-measurement or poverty-measurement problem. To be more precise we will suppose that for any i, x i ∈ X where X is a subset of the real line. The exact assumption that we make about X is a reflection of our assumption about the nature of "income": for example, it is common to assume that X consists only of non-negative numbers (appropriate if "income" actually means consumption expenditure; but for some inequality problems (such as the inequality of net worth) negative values make perfectly good sense.
The number x i may or may not completely represent person i's well-being. Whether or not it does so depends on the use to which we want to put the measurement tools. Although a comprehensive definition of income would be required for welfare-based interpretations of inequality (see section 4) much of the formal analysis applies equally to broadly based and narrowly based definitions of income. The principal requirement is that the equalisand, "income", however it is defined, be representable on a cardinal scale. 2
Income distributions
In our framework an "income distribution" is simply an n-vector of people's incomes x := (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ). It is useful to express mean income in shorthand form as
In analysing inequality it is sometimes useful to merge populations and then to analyse the income distribution in the merged society. To handle this we use the following notation: if x and x are vectors with n and n components respectively, then (x, x ) is an (n + n )-vector formed by stringing the components of x and x together. Given a precise specification of "income", incorporated in the assumption about X the set of all possible income distributions is given by X n ; but sometimes we want to refer only the subset of this consisting of only of distributions with a specified mean µ: we will write this as X n (µ). We will use 1 to denote the vector (1, 1, ..., 1): so, for example, µ1 is a perfectly equal distribution with mean µ.
Clearly we could talk about inequality within a very simple economy consisting of just two persons. But this would not be very interesting. In Figure 1 the horizontal axis measure Irene's income and the vertical axis Janet's income; the 45 • ray through the origin represents distributions that are perfectly equal, the point marked x shows the supposed current income distribution (with Irene richer than Janet) and the solid line through x (at right-angles to the equality ray) represents all the distributions that could be reached from x by simple income transfers. So the point µ1 -where µ = µ(x) is mean income -represents the distribution that would emerge if incomes were to be equalised between Irene and Janet. If Irene and Janet's incomes were swapped to give the income distribution x presumably inequality would remain unchanged; if the income distribution x were to be moved closer to µ1 then presumably inequality would be reduced. But we do not need a formal inequality measure to tell us this, nor do we need a formal statement of distributional principles in order to make sensible comparisons of distribution.
By contrast Figure 2 shows that distributional comparisons could be much more interesting in a 3-person world. The axes measure the incomes of Irene, Janet and Karen; as before x shows the supposed current income distribution (with Irene richer than Janet who is richer than Karen); the triangular shaped area (formally known as a simplex) is X 3 (µ), representing all the possible distributions with the same mean as x; and, again as before, the point µ1 in this triangle represents the distribution that would emerge if incomes were to be equalised among all three persons (the ray through 0 and µ1 represents all such perfectly equal distributions. Straightaway we can see that this threeperson case represents us with a much richer set of alternatives for comparison in terms of inequality. For example: whereas there was one other income distribution achievable by switching identities in the two-person case, now there are up to five such distributions: should all be regarded as equally unequal? Presumably a change in the distribution from x to a point on the line joining x and µ1 would reduce inequality, but what about some other move within the simplex away from x and in the general direction of µ1 -would that reduce inequality? To answer these questions precisely we need to introduce some formal analysis. We do this in section 3.
The axiomatic approach
The formality that we will apply to the inequality-measurement problem and later to its counterpart in poverty analysis can be described as the axiomatic method, which can be briefly explained as follows:
• set out and defend on a priori grounds a minimal set of principles or axioms to which inequality comparisons or poverty comparisons ought to conform;
• follow mathematical logic to characterise the class of measures that exactly satisfy these principles;
• if necessary add further axioms to narrow down the class of measures. Clearly the method is only as good as the reasonableness of the individual axioms that we choose to introduce. "Reasonable" here could mean that the axiom accords with economic intuition, or that it accords with people's views on distributional comparisons, or that it simplifies an otherwise intractable mathematical problem, or that it is helpful in empirical implementation.
Measurement tools
There is a variety of types of measurement tool that might be considered for the analysis of inequality and poverty. We will focus on three types:
• 1 A distributional ordering. Here we want to be able to say something like this: "When we compare distributions x and x either (i) inequality in x is higher than in x , or (ii) inequality in x is higher than in x, or (iii) inequality in x and x is the same." To do this we would just need an inequality index that is defined up to a monotonic transformation. The same thing applies also to distributional orderings in terms of povertyjust substitute the word "poverty" for "inequality" in the foregoing.
• 2 A distributional ranking. This is similar to type 1 but we allow for one further possibility in addition to (i)-(iii) above: "(iv) x and x cannot be unambiguously compared in terms of inequality (or poverty)."
• 3 A cardinal index. Inequality or poverty can be represented by a cardinal index that is defined up to a change of scale. Comparing this with type 1 we can see that it is similar but, whereas in type 1 the index could be subjected to any order-preserving transformation and still be regarded as operationally the same index, here we allow only scale changes. 3
Inequality measurement: principles
Let us begin with with a standard measurement tool, an inequality measure: this is a function I that assigns a numerical value to any distribution in X n . We would write the inequality of income distribution x as
For the moment we are only concerned with making simple inequality comparisons of any two members of X n , so a particular function I could be replaced by any increasing transform (for example log (I) ,I 2 ,exp (I) , ...) and leave the comparisons unchanged; we are talking about a "type 1" measurement tool in the language of section 2.3.
Inequality measures and their properties
Following the outline in section 2.2 our first step is to set out a set of axioms (assumptions) each of which can be defended on its own merits. In fact a small group of core assumptions -Axioms 1-4 below -is sufficient to characterise completely a widely used class of inequality measures. Some of these core axioms are also relevant to poverty measurement. We will discuss their reasonableness as we go along.
Axiom 1 (Anonymity). Suppose x is formed from x by a permutation of the components; then I (x) = I (x ).
Axiom 2 (Population Principle). I (x) = I (x, x, ..., x).
Axiom 3 (Transfer Principle)
. Suppose x is formed from x thus:
Axioms 1 and 2 are easily expressed in plain language: for any income distribution, relabelling the persons in the distribution or simply replicating the distribution leaves inequality unaffected. However, we should not let these two 3 An example. It is arguable that the variance could be used as a satisfactory inequality measure; if so then the standard deviation would do just as well if we are merely concerned with a distributional ordering; but if we want a cardinal index then the standard deviation will give different results from the variance. Note also that, strictly speaking we should allow for, scale and origin changes for a cardinal index. However, if we assume that the minimum value of the inequality or poverty index is set at zero this automatically fixes the origin.
[Karen]
[Janet] apparently innocuous assumptions pass without some comment. The anonymity principle seems fine as long as we really believe that income captures all that is important about a person's current economic status (we have sorted out any difficulties concerning differences in needs, for example) and that history is unimportant (if it were known that Irene had had been heavily disadvantaged and Janet excessively privileged in the past then some might not think that swapping the current incomes x i and x j is neutral in terms of inequality). Axiom 3 says that a mean-preserving redistribution from anyone to someone who is richer must increase inequality -and vice versa, of course (Dalton 1920) . Figure  3 shows a closeup (taken from Figure 2 ) of the income distribution x and the other distributions attainable from x through simple transfers. The corners of the triangle represent complete inequality (where Irene or Janet or Karen receives all the income) and the point in the centre represents complete equality (everyone receives the mean µ). Let us label the point representing distribution x as (i): then simply swapping incomes between pairs of people yields points (ii)-(vi) and Axiom 1 means that all the points (i),...,(vi) are equally unequal. Axiom 3 (the Transfer Principle) implies that inequality must be lower anywhere in the interior of the line connecting adjacent pairs of these points (this would involve a partial equalisation between two of the people, leaving the third person's income unchanged); from further reasoning on the Transfer Principle we can see that the inequality associated with any point in the interior of the hexagon associated with x is less than I (x) (Champernowne and Cowell 1998, Chapter 5) . This interpretation immediately reveals an apparent difficulty, illustrated in Figure 4 . Suppose we try to compare distributions x and x in terms of inequality: it is clear that distribution x does not lie inside the x-hexagon (copied from Figure 3 ); nor does x does not lie inside the x -hexagon. The Transfer Principle is insufficient to produce a clear inequality ranking of all the points in X n (µ). There are two ways forward from here: [Karen] [Janet]
[Irene] Figure 5 , each of which satisfies Axioms 1-3: contours further away from the centre correspond to higher inequality levels. Ideally such a contour map should be supported by further axioms with a clear rationale in terms of economic intuition.
2. One could live with the ambiguity and obtain a richer insight into inequality comparisons. We give up on finding a type-1 inequality measurement tool and consider type-2 comparisons -this is pursued in section 6.
Let us follow up the first of these routes now by introducing two further apparently reasonable axioms.
Axiom 4 (Decomposability). Let x, x ∈ X n (µ) and x ∈ X n (µ).
Decomposability (Axiom 4) means this: take two distributions x and x with the same population size n and the same mean µ; merge each of them with any third distribution x that has the same mean µ (but not necessarily the same population size); then, if x is more unequal than x , x-merged-with-x is also more unequal than x -merged-with-x .
Scale Invariance (Axiom 5), also known as "homotheticity", is a property that applies to the shape of the contour maps at different levels of income. If x and x register the same amount of inequality in X n (µ) then the "scaled-up" or "scaled-down" versions of these distributions, where each person's income is rescaled by the same factor λ, are also regarded as equally unequal in X n (λµ). The property is illustrated in Figure 6 where the contours at the higher income level can be regarded as a "blow-up" of the inequality contours at the lower income level. Notice that Axiom 5 does not say that inequality remains constant under a scale change of all incomes; of course it may make sense to replace this axiom with the stronger requirement of scale independence, namely that I (λx) = I (x); but this is not necessary for the basic results. Also, using scale invariance rather than scale independence leaves upon an interesting possibility, discussed in subsection 3.1.3 below.
Scale-invariant inequality measures
Equipped with these two extra axioms we have the following result (Bourguignon 1979; Cowell 1980; Shorrocks 1980 Shorrocks , 1984 Russell 1985; Zagier 1982) : 
where α is a sensitivity parameter that can be assigned any real value. 5
From Theorem 1 emerges not a single inequality measure but a broad class or family of measures commonly known as the generalised entropy (GE) measures (Cowell 1977 , Cowell and Kuga 1981a , 1981b Toyoda 1975) ; the class forms an important example of so-called relative inequality indices (Blackorby and Donaldson 1978) . Any one member of the family in (3), picked out by a 4 Continuity of the index is a technical requirement which ensures that measured inequality does not "jump" by a substantial amount when there is an infinitesimal change in the income distribution: for an interesting exception to this see note 23 on poverty indices. Two measures I and I are said to be ordinally equivalent over X n (µ) if there is a function f , increasing in its first argument, such that I = f (I; n, µ). 5 Using L'Hôpital's rule one can show that the limiting form for the case α = 0 is given by
, the so-called Mean Logarithmic Deviation and the limiting form for the case α = 1 is given by Figure 7 illustrates the iso-inequality contours for various values of α. In the case α = −∞ we can see that redistribution between the richest and the next richest leaves inequality unaltered -only redistribution involving the poorest affects measured inequality; by contrast in the case α = +∞ we can see that redistribution between the poorest and the next poorest leaves inequality unaltered -only redistribution involving the richest affects measured inequality; by similar reasoning we can see that for positive values of α the GE index is more sensitive to changes at the top of distribution and for negative values of α the GE index is more sensitive to changes at the bottom of distribution.
However reasonable alternatives to Axioms 4 and 5 are available. First, let us consider modifying the statement of Axiom 4, so that there is no "overlap" between the incomes in x and the incomes in x or x -either the income of the poorest person in x is at least as high as that of the richest person in x or x , or the income of the richest person in x is at no greater than that of the poorest person in x or x . The relative inequality measures in (3) also work for this case and in addition we find that now a further inequality index is also available (Ebert 1988b) :
This is the Gini index and its contours are depicted in Figures 5(b) and 6.
Translation-invariant inequality measures
Now consider a second alternative to the standard axioms. In place of scale invariance it is sometimes argued that the following structural assumption is appropriate (Kolm 1976a (Kolm , 1976b :
Again, notice that this is just a requirement on the pattern of the contours and it is weaker than requiring translation independence, namely I (x) = I (x+δ1). If we replace the scale-invariance property used in Theorem 1 with translation invariance then we have the following result (Bosmans and Cowell 2010) :
Theorem 2 Axioms 1-4 and 6 imply that a continuous inequality index must either be ordinally equivalent to
where β = 0 is a sensitivity parameter, or to
(replacing the case β = 0).
Equation (5) gives us a class of absolute measures (Blackorby and Donaldson 1980b) of inequality; members of this class for which β > 0 expression are ordinally equivalent to the Kolm (1976a) class of indices:
Equation (6) is just the variance. Again if we use the non-overlapping version of decomposability we find that there is another index that is both decomposable and translation-invariant:
the so-called "absolute Gini" -the connection with the regular Gini in (4) is obvious. In contrast to scale invariance -where the inequality-contour map remains invariant under scalar transformations of income -translation invariance means that the contour map remains invariant under uniform additions to or subtractions from income. 6 Figure 8 : Scale or translation independence?
Inequality and income levels
For two separate inequality measures (contour maps) both scale-and translationinvariance can hold simultaneously -see Figure 8 where for both the variance and for the Gini coefficient one can connect the contours at different levels of income either along rays through the origin (scale invariance) or along lines parallel to the ray through (translation invariance). However, we may be interested in a stronger requirement: scale-or translation-independence. Here scale independence means that inequality stays the same as all incomes are increased proportionately -I (x) = I (λx) -and translation independence means that inequality stays the same as all incomes are increased by the same absolute amount -I (x) = I (x+δ1). Clearly both cannot be true at the same time unless one confines attention to trivial cases of perfectly equal distributions.
Decomposition
The decomposability property (Axiom 4) enables us to examine the breakdown of inequality by population subgroups. This property is particularly useful if we want to get some insight on to the apparent "causes" of overall income inequality. There need to be heavy quotation marks around the word "causes": it is interesting to know, for example, whether changes in world inequality appear to be associated with changes in the income distribution within individual countries or with changes in the overall income levels in the various countries; but obviously we would be doing no more than a kind of sophisticated distributional accounting procedure. Nonetheless, this kind of accounting procedure can be informative if properly carried out. 7
Arbitrary partition
To fix ideas, suppose we partition the population into m arbitrary subgroups that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive; for example if the partition were by sex we might have m = 2 groups ("male", "female") or possibly m = 3 groups if we allow for the value "unknown" alongside "male" and "female". The decomposability property means that we can write overall inequality as a function of inequality in each subgroup = 1, ..., m which may also depend on the population shares of each subgroup, π (defined as n /n , where m =1 n = n ) and the income shares of each subgroup , s (defined as µ n /µn , where m =1 s = 1 ). In its most general form we would have:
where x means the income distribution in subgroup . If we also require that the inequality measure be scale invariant (Axiom 5) then, as we know, the inequality measure has to take the form (3), or a transform of it. So in this case we could write 8
where w := π 1−α s α (11) and x Betw is the distribution that would emerge if, for every group , all n persons were to receive exactly µ , the mean of group , so that
Equation (10) gives us an additive decomposition formula and is easy to interpret. The first term on the right-hand side represents aggregate within-group inequality and consists of the weighted sum of inequality in each subgroup where the weights are given by (11); the second term is the between-group component of inequality. So, in principle we can make a clear distinction between the contribution to overall inequality of the inequality in any one particular group, between the inequality within one group and the weight accorded to that group in the aggregation, and between the aggregate within-group component and the between-group component (for example, on the one hand, the inequality among males and among females weighted using (11) and, on the other hand inequality between males and females. One might wonder whether (11) yields numbers that represent "weights" as conventionally understood: after all it is clear that although they will be nonnegative they may not sum to 100 percent. However, the formula for the weights (11) immediately reveals that there are exactly two cases where the adding-up property will hold:
• where α = 0, which yields pure population weights (we aggregate using the relative numbers of men and women); this is the case of the Mean Logarithmic Deviation index;
• where α = 1, which yields pure income weights (we aggregate using the relative income levels rich men and women are); this is the case of the Theil index.
Clearly it is a matter of judgment whether one requires that the weights sum to 100 percent; it might be considered an extra that is of secondary importance compared with the flexibility of being able to select from the full range of values of the sensitivity parameter α.
Restricted partition
There is a further dimension of choice by the user of inequality measures. In the previous subsection we implicitly assumed that any and every possible partition of the population might be considered in the decomposition exercise. However we know from subsection 3.1.1 that if we restrict attention to cases where there is no "overlap" of incomes then the Gini coefficient (4) is also available as a scale-independent inequality measure alongside (3). What this means in the present context is that we choose the subgroups = 1, ..., m such that every income in group is less than or equal to the minimum income in group (or every income in group is greater than or equal to the maximum income in group ) then we could also use the Gini coefficient in a decomposition like (9). To see how this works, let us first note that it is always possible to rewrite the Gini formula (4) in a weighted-income form as follows
where (i) stands for "ith smallest" and the κ i act as the weights and are given by
Note that the κ i take into account each person's position in the distribution (i/n). This has a nice interpretation. Assume that Irene is richer than Janet who is richer than Karen. Suppose Irene's income increases by $1 and Janet's income decreases by $1 -checking (13) and (14) this transfer by itself means that inequality must have increased by an amount 2 nµ [i − j] > 0; suppose also that Karen's income increases by $1 and Janet's income decreases by $1 -this transfer by itself means that inequality must have decreased by an amount 2 nµ [k − j]<0; whether the combined is positive or negative depends on whether the difference in position i − j is larger or smaller than j − k.
Suppose we break down the population into two subgroups F and M where no-one in the F group has an income higher than anyone in the M group. Clearly inequality in the F group could be written
where κ i (x F ) is person i's positional weight evaluated within the F group alone:
From (14) and (16) we have
and we also find:
which gives an exact formula for decomposing the Gini coefficient into nonoverlapping subgroups F and M. The importance of non-overlapping incomes in the decomposition can be easily seen if we think about the joint Janet→Irene and Janet→Karen transfer mentioned above. The effects of these two transfers on inequality within the F group are just π F s F times the effects of these two transfers on inequality in the whole population: again they just depend on the relative size of i − j and j − k. So, if inequality goes up in the F group, then it also goes up in the population as a whole, an example of the property known as subgroup consistency. Now suppose instead that two people from the M group, Gordon and Harry let us say, have incomes that overlap with those in the F group; specifically Gordon and Harry are richer than Janet but poorer than Irene. Clearly the effect of the joint Janet→Irene and Janet→Karen transfer on inequality within the F group is just what it was in the earlier example; but the effect in the population as a whole now depends on the relative size of i − j + 2 and j − k (remember the two guys between Irene and Janet). So it would be possible to find that inequality goes down in the F group and up in the distribution as a whole even though inequality in the M group, inequality between the groups and the weights on the groups stay the same!
Alternative approach: reference points
The driving assumption for characterising inequality in the majority of the theoretical literature is some form of the transfer principle (see Axiom 3). But in its classic form (Dalton 1920) it is often rejected by people when invited to compare income distributions Cowell 1992, 1999 ) and, while elegant, it is obviously restrictive. An alternative approach to inequality is to think of it as an aggregation of distance from a relevant reference point. The reference point could, for example, be an income that is associated with a particular group. This is the essence of the Temkin approach of characterising inequality in terms of complaints about income distribution (Temkin 1986 , Temkin 1993 , Devooght 2003 , Cowell and Ebert 2004 : these "complaints" are effectively the distances just mentioned and typically upward-looking comparisons.
This alternative approach to the assessment of income distribution is individualistic -as with the standard approach in section 3.1 -but is based on a concept of differences rather than on income levels. To make this operational we first need to specify r (x), a reference income that usually depends on the incomes in the current distribution x: we will discuss below three different specifications for r (x) that lead to interesting forms for inequality measures. The second thing to specify is a set of axioms to characterise the implicit notion of distance from the reference point (the "complaint") and the function which aggregates the individual distances Cowell and Ebert (2004) showed that, under standard assumptions, distance must must be of the form
with the reference-point based inequality index given by
where the w i are positive numbers (weights) and θ is a sensitivity parameter. 9 Both the sensitivity parameter θ and the weights may incorporate distributional values. Consider an income transfer from poorer Janet to richer Irene that leaves the reference point unchanged. This increases Janet's distance and decreases Irene's distance from the unchanged reference point. From (20) it is clear that the effect of this transfer is proportional to
; So if Irene is richer than Janet and if the reference point is left unchanged, this transfer will increase inequality if w j ≥ w i and θ > 1 (or w j > w i and θ = 1).
Three special cases of the reference point r (x), highlighted by Temkin's seminal work, are of particular interest.
(1) The Best-off Person (BoP)
Here everyone but the richest person has a complaint about inequality. The reference point for everyone is:
Of the three types of reference point suggested by Temkin (1986) this is, perhaps, the most intriguing. For a start in this case there is a second type of "transfer principle" the effect of transferring income to the richest person (everyone's reference point) from any of the other n − 1 persons.. As we have noted, the regular transfer principle (Axiom 3 whereby inequality increases for any poorer to richer transfer) holds for only for a specific range of parameter values in (20); but for all θ, the inequality measure (20) satisfies the principle of transfers-to-the-richest. So there could be some tension between the two types of transfer principle: if θ ≤ 0 absolute priority is placed on the salience of the best-off person: so if Irene is the richest and Janet is richer than Karen then Karen→Janet transfers may reduce inequality (such a transfer reduces the distance between Janet and Irene) but if an Irene→Janet transfer always reduces inequality (distance is reduced everywhere).
Let us look at the counterparts to Figures 5 and 7 in the case of referencepoint inequality. Some typical contours contours of I Temk are depicted in Figure  9 for cases where the regular transfer principle is satisfied and in Figure 10 for the case where shows the effect of changing the the regular transfer principle is not satisfied. Notice that if the weights are equal each contour breaks down into three segments; if we have differential weights when aggregating the distance in (20) then we have six segments in each contour (as in the case of I Gini ). In Figure 10 where the segments bend the "wrong" way we can see that equalising Janet→Karen transfers increase inequality.
(2) All Those Better Off As with BoP, everyone but the best off has a "complaint" about income distribution. However in this case people at different positions in the income distribution have different reference points:
If we replace r (x) by r i (x) in (19) then the resulting inequality measure in (20) is essentially the same as the deprivation index suggested by Chakravarty and Mukherjee (1999) . 10 Figure 9 : BoP-reference inequality (Axiom 3 is satisfied) Figure 10 : BoP-reference inequality (Axiom 3 is not satisfied)
(3) Average income
If the reference point is just mean income
then substituting in (19) yields a class of inequality measures (20) that is closely related to the family of "compromise" inequality measures in Ebert (1988a) .
Inequality: welfare and values
Inequality measurement is not, or should not be, just about formal propositions in mathematical language. Inequality is something about which some individuals feel passionately and which is, arguable, a proper concern of public policy. So, it is important to examine the ways in which ethical principles may be incorporated in the analysis of inequality measurement.
Social welfare and inequality
For a discussion of the role of social values or ethical principles we need an additional basic tool, the social-welfare function, written as
which gives a numerical score for every income distribution x in X n ; in this context each x i is assumed to completely represent person i's well-being. The question immediately arises -what values or principles should be embodied in W ? If social values broadly consider that income increases are on the whole a good thing and inequality increases are a bad thing we would want this to be built into the structure of W . Clearly it is necessary to connect the formula for social welfare (21) to the formulas for mean income (1) and inequality measure (2). A simple representation representation of this connection is as the reducedform social-welfare function:
where the function Ω is increasing in its first argument (mean income) and decreasing in its second argument (inequality). A simple example of this is the social-welfare function given by
from (13) it is clear that this is just the weighted sum of the ordered incomes x (i) where, in view of (14), the weights must be strictly decreasing as i goes from 1 to n. Clearly the properties of the function W and the function I are intimately connected: for any given value of µ they will have the same contours in X n (but of course the contours will be numbered in opposite directions -inequality increases imply welfare decreases. However, the relationship with income levels needs further comment. It is common to assume that W is strictly increasing in each income x i (the so-called monotonicity property) -this would mean that, if the status quo is distribution x then social welfare would be increasing in the direction of any of the arrows in Figure 11 (a) . But it could be argued that this is unacceptably strong; as an alternative we might suggest either the weaker requirement that welfare should increase if all incomes were to be increased simultaneously by the same proportional amount (if λ > 1 we would have W (λx) > W (x) so that welfare increases along the steeper of the arrows in Figure 11 b) or the even weaker requirement that welfare should increase if all incomes were to be increased simultaneously by the same absolute amount (if δ > 0 we would have W (x+δ1) > W (x) so that welfare increases along the flatter of the arrows in Figure 11 b) 11 Figure 11 : Social welfare and income growth If we now rethink the contour maps in Figures 5 to 8 as contours of the SWF for given mean income, it is clear that one could read this as though the function W in (21) and (22) "inherits" the properties of the inequality measure I in (2) (22). But it may be more appropriate to read this in the reverse direction: inequality is something that is considered socially undesirable or even wrong; this principle is built into the specification of the SWF; this specification determines the contours of the SWF and therefore the inequality contours that appear in the diagrams of section 3. But what values? They can be essentially characterised as two types of tradeoff:
1. Tradeoffs between equality and efficiency. Inequality represents a loss of welfare -as one moves within the simplex away from the centre one moves to lower welfare contours. How much should one give weight to a movement towards the centre of the simplex µ1, relative to movement from one µ-simplex to a "higher one?
2. Tradeoffs between income differences one part of the distribution relative to those in another: if Irene is richer than Janet who is richer than Karen should we prioritise the Irene-Janet income differences or the Janet-Karen differences?
Welfare-based inequality measures
Once one is persuaded of the idea that the social wrong of inequality can be expressed in terms of a loss of social welfare and that inequality measures inherit their properties from SWFs or vice versa there emerges a natural way of characterising inequality in welfare terms. It might at first be thought that there is an obstacle to using the SWF to specify an inequality index since there are no "natural" units for the measurement welfare. But we could measure welfare -and therefore gains or losses of welfare -in terms of income. To do this, introduce the concept of the equally-distributed equivalent (EDE) income. For any distribution x this can be represented as a number ξ such that
The EDE-income is a remarkably robust concept since little more than that W be a continuous function is needed in order to be sure that any distribution x has its corresponding EDE-income ξ. We could, if we wish, invert the relationship (24) to make the dependence of ξ on the income distribution explicit
It is important to recognise that (21) and (25) do the same job: in using ξ rather than W we have just chosen a cardinalisation of the social-welfare function that is convenient to work with. If the SWF has been specified so that unequal distributions register a loss of social welfare then we may deduce that:
where µ is the mean, defined in (1). 12 A simple twist on (26) gives us the following generic welfare-based index of inequality
which is unit-free, non-negative and assumes the value 0 when x = µ1. Once again, similarly to (23) it is clear that, by taking the EDE-income cardinalisation of welfare, we can write
-compare this with equation (23). The idea is illustrated in Figure 12 which shows the contours of W in the space of Irene and Janet's incomes. Point x represents the current income distribution and the line through x and µ1 gives all the distributions with the same mean µ. The dotted 45-degree ray represents equal distributions and it is clear that the contours are symmetric about this ray (swapping Irene's and Janet's identities leaves social welfare unchanged). The contour through the point x intersects the equality ray at point ξ1 where ξ is the EDE income. The gap between ξ (x) and µ (x) is the loss of welfare associated with the inequality implicit in x and can be used to calculate the inequality index (27). Obviously to go further we would need to know more about the shape of W . Figure 12 : Social welfare and inequality So, to make these ideas clearer, let us take a specific type of of SWF: it is useful to consider all that the functions W that can be written in the additively separable form:
where ζ is a social-evaluation function that is the same for all individuals; in this specification we evaluate social welfare by going through the population, evaluating each person's income x i and then summing the individual evaluations. In particular we may need two further restrictions on the family of SWFs in (28): 1. functions W where ζ (x) is increasing in x: see Figure 13 (a) and (b); 2. functions W where ζ (x) is increasing in x and also the slope of ζ is decreasing in x: see Figure 13 (b).
This specification is appealing and intuitive; but it is also quite restrictive because it effectively allows only one type of relationship between mean income and welfare: (the monotonicity property described above, implied by restriction 1) and it collapses the two types of tradeoff mentioned at the end of section 4.1 into a single tradeoff (implicit in the curvature of ζ in Figure 13 b ).
Figure 13: Evaluation functions ζ
In this set-up social attitudes towards income distribution and inequality are embodied in the social-evaluation function ζ. If this function is differentiable let us write the slope of ζ at any point x as ζ (x): given the above restrictions ζ (x) is positive for any x; and, given restriction 2, the slope of the function ζ must be negative (ζ (x) < 0). The importance of this can be seen if we use equation (28) to express the change in social welfare dW that would arise if, for example, some policy or event changed individual incomes by the amounts (dx 1 , dx 2 , · · · , dx n ). Clearly we have
which could be thought of as being the weighted sum of the income changes, where the weight on the change in Irene's income equals the marginal social evaluation of Irene's income. The weight is positive and decreases with income; how sharply the weights decrease depends on how sharply curved is the function ζ. We can characterise the curvature of ζ by using ε (x), the elasticity of marginal social evaluation at x, namely the percentage by which the weight falls given a one percent increase in income:
To fix ideas consider the family of functions ζ for which ε is a given constant; some of these are illustrated in Figure 14 . The general formula is 13
so that the formula for the weights in this case is just
Let us compute the effect on social welfare of a change in the incomes of Irene and Janet; from (29) and (32) we have:
Let us suppose that Irene has t times the income of Janet, with t > 1. In this case we can easily find the tradeoff between Irene and Janet that would keep social-welfare constant. By putting x i = tx j and dW = 0 in (33) we get
What this tells us is the tradeoff between equality and efficiency implicit in W . If one were to raise poor Janet's income by $1 then a sacrifice of up to $t ε by rich Irene would maintain or improve the current level of social welfare. For example, suppose t = 5: then if ε = 1 2 a sacrifice of up to $2.24 by Irene would be warranted to increase Irene's income by $1; but if ε = 1 the allowable sacrifice by Irene would rise to $5 ... and so on. Clearly this amount increases with the value of the elasticity ε and for this reason ε is usually known as the inequality aversion parameter.
An alternative way of interpreting ε is in terms of simple transfers in different parts of the income distribution. Suppose that Irene's income is t times that of Janet's and that Janet's income is t times that of Karen (t > 1). Then, using (33) we can calculate the (welfare-increasing) effect of a straight Irene-Janet transfer and that of a Janet-Karen transfer of the same amount:
Dividing the one by the other we have
Since t > 1 by assumption, this is obviously greater than one if ε > 0, so that dW jk > dW ij (the transfer is more effective lower down the income scale). But we can see more: the relative size of the lower-income transfer effect gets larger, the higher is ε. This second interpretation of ε in equation (37) is logically separate from the equality-efficiency interpretation in (34): but, in the special case where social welfare is additive (28), the two concepts happen to have the same value. If we use the additive, isoelastic form of the SWF defined by (28) and (31) then the EDE income in (24) takes the form of a generalised mean: 38) and the associated inequality measure (27) takes the form of the Atkinson class of indices (Atkinson 1970) : 14
For a given unequal distribution x the higher is ε the lower is ξ (x) and the higher is I Atk (x). Comparing I GE (x) with I Atk (x) -equations (3) and (39) respectively -several points are immediately striking: • In both cases we have a class of indices rather than a single inequality measure; individual members of the class are characterised by a sensitivity parameter (α in the case of I GE and ε in the case of I Atk ); the user of the inequality measure brings some personal or social judgment to the measurement problem by the choice of the parameter.
• The ordering of income distributions produced by a member of the Atkinson class with parameter ε is the same as the corresponding GE index with parameter α = 1 − ε: they produce the same inequality contours in the distribution simplex of Figure 2 . 15
• In both cases the inequality contours are induced by a structural assumption -scale invariance (Axiom 5) in the case of the GE indices, isoelasticity of the social-evaluation function in the case of the Atkinson indices.
Welfare and individual values
Clearly we can use the welfare-function approach to determine the shape of the inequality contours in section 3.1. But a more important issue is, how the characteristics of the welfare function are to be determined. There are several routes through which we might imagine this to happen, which can be grouped into two broad categories:
• Representation of innate desire for redistribution. Individual members of society might have a preference for equality that is expressed through the political process, through charitable giving or through survey responses. 16 Society's aversion to inequality is based on an externality involving other people's incomes (Hochman and Rodgers 1969; Kolm 1964 Kolm , 1969 Thurow 1971 ) .
• Imputation of a social ranking of income distributions from individual rankings of probability distributions. One might take the position that in some sense social values are a representation of individual preferences or views behind a "veil of ignorance." Here no-one need be averse to inequality per se. However, everyone may be averse to risk and in particular everyone may be averse to the risk associated with the lottery of life (Harsanyi, 1953 (Harsanyi, , 1955 (Harsanyi, 1978 Rawls, 1971 Rawls, , 1999 . Because individuals experience a loss of utility through risk and are willing to sacrifice income in order to insure against it, inequality -the social counterpart of riskleads to social welfare loss.
In practice aversion to inequality may come from both of these routes and people may not view risk and inequality in exactly the same way (Cowell and Schokkaert 2001 , Kroll and Davidovitz 2003 , Carlsson et al. 2005 .
From the discussion of equation (34) above it is clear that the degree of inequality aversion can be seen in terms of the calibration of a tradeoff -either (a) between greater equality and higher overall income or (b) between transfers in different parts of the distribution. For the Atkinson indices (39) the precise tradeoff can be characterised by the value of ε, the elasticity of marginal social evaluation,. Clearly then, an important further question for policy-makers is how to determine reasonable values for ε. If we want to base this on the views of everyday people we could appeal to experimental or questionnaire evidence. However, caution is necessary in interpreting such evidence: preferences reversals can arise in the context of social choice similar to those that arise in the context of individual choice (Amiel et al. 2008 ) and estimates of ε from from leaky-bucket exercises may be affected by way the issue is put (Pirttilä and Uusitalo 2010) . Evidence from happiness studies suggest a value of 1.0 to 1.5 for ε (Layard et al. 2008) ; inferring ε from tax schedules we find a value of around 1.2 to 1.4 (Cowell and Gardiner 2000) .
Poverty measurement: principles
The fundamental difference between the inequality-measurement problem and the poverty-measurement problem is, of course, the poverty line. The poverty line performs several roles in the poverty-measurement problem: it partitions the population into two groups that we want to treat differently in analysing income distribution; it forms a reference point; it can be a policy parameter in its own right. But, of course, reading through this list of roles we can spot several points where there appear to be important links with inequality analysis: the decomposition into poor and non-poor subgroups and the concept of a reference income, for example. So we may expect -and indeed we will find -some carryover of the measurement analysis from Section 3.
A lot could be written on the income concept that is appropriate for the analysis of poverty and the determination of the poverty line, but such arguments are usually about the implementation of the principles of poverty measurement rather than the principles themselves. Once again we will suppose that an income concept has been specified (this "income" could, for example, be defined as consumption expenditure or as assets) and so an income distribution is just a vector of real numbers, as we discussed in section 2.1. The poverty line could be determined with reference to the living standards in the society represented by the income distribution; it could be fixed by international standards or by the observer's own personal introspection; it could be determined from the distribution itself (for example many empirical studies use half the median income as a poverty line). For our purposes it is convenient for the moment to suppose that the poverty line is an exogenously given number z: any person i for whom x i ≤ z is deemed to be poor. 17
What do we mean by a poverty measure? The language is important here because the intuitive approaches discussed in section 5.1 focuses on simple measures with cardinal significance, 18 but for formal approaches the discussion is sometimes of specific indices, sometimes of orderings: in section 5.2 we will focus on poverty orderings, as in section 3 on inequality. We will consider more general poverty rankings separately, in section 6.
Intuitive approaches
There are several poverty indices that spring to mind naturally from no more than a brief scan of the data and the simplest calculations. These are indices that are used by policy makers and that provide numbers with a compelling, common-sense interpretation. They also serve as reference points for the more sophisticated analysis in section 5.2. The leading indices are as follows.
• Headcount ratio. For any z we just work out n z , the number in the population with incomes less than or equal to z, and divide this by the population:
• Average income gap ratio (1). For each person i define the individual income gap is the income shortfall (if any) below the poverty line:
Then the average income gap ratio (relative to the poverty line) is
• Average income gap ratio (2). An alternative normalisation for the average income gap is 1 n
Notice that the average in (42) is taken over the number who are poor, whereas the average in (43) is over the whole population. Which of the poverty measures (40), (42) and (43) is "right"? In a sense, all of them are. We can regard the headcount ratio and the average incomegap ratio as picking up two different, complementary aspects of poverty: the practice governmental agencies and others often adopt the weak version. Clearly this is important for poverty measures that rely on a head count of the poor (are people with incomes exactly equal to z poor or not?) such as (40) below, but not for the other poverty measures and results discussed below (Zheng 1997, Donaldson and Weymark 1986) .
18 See Section 2.3 for a discussion of the terminology.
head-count ratio focuses on the labelling effect of poverty, the proportion of the population that carries the disfiguring mark of being poor; the average gap concept gives us some idea of the resources necessary to eliminate poverty. Version 1 (equation 42) expresses the resource-requirement interpretation relative to the poverty line; version 2 (equation 43) expresses the same idea as a proportion of resources available in the economy. It is clear that any two of these intuitive measures could contradict each other in terms of answering the question whether poverty has increased or decreased, even with a fixed poverty line. 19 But this does not necessarily matter: the different measures just reveal different things about the concept of poverty and our understanding is enriched by having these different perspectives.
Axiomatic approach
Why should we want to go beyond these simple, intuitive approaches? A good answer to this question is that it may be appropriate to consider whether poverty measurement should take into account more information about the income distribution. The simple summary statistics in (40)-(43) remain unchanged if there is some redistribution among the poor that leaves unchanged the numbers and average income of the poor. However, this would imply that we consider the following two distributions to represent the same level of aggregate poverty: (a) a distribution where all poor people have exactly the same income and (b) a distribution in which poor people are polarised into two groups, those close to destitution and those just below the poverty line. If the distribution amongst the poor is of concern then we may need a more sophisticated poverty measure (Watts 1968 , Sen 1976 . Why could an axiomatic approach be useful? A good answer to this question is that, as with inequality measurement, there may be specific aspects of the comparison of income distributions in terms of poverty that are best considered as abstract principles; expressing these principles in terms of formal axioms may help to narrow down the class of poverty measures that may be worth considering in addition to -or even instead of -the intuitive approaches outlined in section 5.1. However, in the case of poverty, it may be that some of the additional formality that has been introduced has tended to obscure rather than illuminate the central issues. Some of the axioms 20 that have been suggested are less persuasive than their counterparts in inequality analysis and some may actually obscure the insights available from the simpler approaches in section 5.1 Perhaps poverty is in danger of being over-axiomed.
Methodologically the approach is similar to what we did in the case of inequality: the principal difference is that rather than just comparing distributions n-vectors we are now working with n + 1 incomes (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n , z) -or, written more compactly, (x, z) . Some of the axioms from section 3 can be carried over with just minor notational modification: where this works we will just note how the axiom needs to be adapted (this is usually little more than cosmetic) rather than writing everything out explicitly in the new notation.
Basic form
The first key result needs the anonymity property (Axioms 1), adapted by replacing I with P and three new axioms:
Axiom 7 (Focus). Suppose x is formed from x thus:
Axiom 8 (Monotonicity). Suppose x is formed from x thus:
Axiom 9 (Independence). Consider x, y ∈ X n such that P (x, z) = P (y, z) and, for some person i, x i = y i < z. Suppose x , y are formed from x, y thus:
We can interpret Axiom 7 as requiring that the incomes of people who are not poor are irrelevant to poverty comparisons. This might be considered the essential axiom of poverty measurement, although in fact the second version of the Average income gap ratio violates it. Axiom 8 means that if the income of any poor person is increased then poverty must decrease 21 (but note that the headcount ratio violates this property). Axiom 9 says the following: take two distributions that are exactly equal in terms of aggregate poverty; suppose there is a particular income x i that is common to both distributions; then varying that common value will change the measured poverty in the two distributions by the same amount, whatever the other incomes in each distribution may be. This property is exhibited by each of the intuitive measures in section 5.1.
Theorem 3 The poverty version of Axiom 1 and Axioms 7-9 jointly imply that a continuous poverty ordering must be representable by the measure
where p is a continuous function that is decreasing in x i as long as x i < z. 21 There is an important difference in the precise definition of monotonicity as defined here in Axiom 8 and the monotonicity property discussed in connection with the SWF in section 4.1: the monotonicity principle for the function W in (21) means that increase in anybody's income (rich or poor) increases welfare; but the monotonicity axiom here applies only to incomes below the poverty line.
So, invoking just a few appealing principles results in a particularly useful class of poverty measures, the Additively Separable Poverty (ASP) class: the crucial assumption for this is Axiom 9, which rules out concepts of poverty that explicitly take into account the person's position in the distribution. At the centre of (44) is the individual poverty-evaluation function p which gives a natural interpretation to the ASP measures. One goes through the population and evaluates each person's income x i in the light of the poverty line: if person i is above the poverty line then the evaluation is zero; if i is exactly on the poverty line then the evaluation is zero; for all other cases the evaluation is higher the lower is i's income.
Of course the form (44) allows a lot of leeway in the precise precise specification of the poverty-evaluation function. Just as we did for inequality measures in section 3.1 it is useful to see what additional principles might be usefully imposed on the structure of income distributions to narrow down the class of admissible poverty measures.
Income structure
In the analysis of inequality measurement we considered scale invariance and translation invariance (Axioms 5 and 6) as two different principles inducing what might appear to be a sensible structure on the map of iso-inequality contours (in the case of just two sets of contours both principles could be applied at the same time -see Figure 5 ). In the analysis of poverty measurement, we can again appeal to these principles but with two important differences: (1) we require them to apply to all n + 1 incomes (x, z) ∈ X n+1 and (2) they not only induce a set of iso-poverty contours but also imply that the resulting poverty indices incorporate a specific relationship between individual incomes and the poverty line. The key result is (Ebert and Moyes 2002) :
Theorem 4 If the ASP poverty indices also satisfy the poverty version of Axioms 5 and 6 then the individual poverty-evaluation function p must take either the form g θ i or the form [g i /z] θ , where g i is defined in (41) and θ is a positive parameter.
An important implication of Theorem 4 is that the scale-invariance and translation-invariance properties alone are enough to restrict the ASP class to some of the most widely employed poverty measures, the so-called Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) indices:
(see Foster et al. 1984) . 22 Once again, as with the GE, Temkin and Atkinson measures in the inequality context, one has a family of indices, indexed by a sensitivity parameter θ. A glance back at section 3.3 also shows the strong similarity between FGT poverty measures and Temkin-type inequality indices, which should not come as a big surprise since they both use a reference point and they are both built on similar axioms regarding scale-and translation-invariance. Theorem 4 implies that θ is a positive number, but is useful to consider the extension of the class (45) to the case θ = 0. 23 The two cases θ = 0,1 have a natural interpretation; these two cases and θ = 2 are illustrated in Figure 15 :
• θ = 0. Letting θ go to zero in (45) we can see that P 0 FGT (x, z) is simply the headcount ratio (40). The individual poverty-evaluation function in this case is illustrated in the top-left panel of Figure 15 : p (x, z) jumps from 1 to 0 as x goes from less than z to more than z.
• θ = 1. In this special case we find
the product of two intuitive poverty indices, the headcount ratio (40) and the average income gap ratio (42). In fact P 1 FGT (x, z) can be taken as yet another convenient way of normalising the average income gap. The individual poverty-evaluation function is illustrated in the top-right panel of Figure 15 : the individual poverty gap g is measured in the opposite direction to x (and is zero for x > z); p (x, z) is proportional to g.
• θ = 2. This is an example of where the poverty measure is sensitive to inequality amongst the poor -it satisfies the transfer principle (Axiom 3). To see this check the individual poverty evaluations on the vertical axis for fairly poor Irene p (x i , z) and very poor Janet p (x j , z); now suppose Irene's and Janet's incomes are equalised and check the poverty evaluation of their averaged incomes on the vertical axis; clearly
and so partial equalisation amongst the poor reduces measured poverty.
Poverty contours
The contours of any member of the class (45) can of course be represented in the income simplex, just as we did with inequality contours. Figure 16 shows an example with θ = 1: the central triangle is determined by the given poverty line z. Within that triangle everyone is out of poverty; outside the triangle some 
Other approaches
Axiom 9 rules out the possibility that individual poverty evaluations depend on the individual's position in the distribution. So, clearly, if we drop the restriction imposed by this axiom other possibilities for poverty measurement are opened up. This was part of the insight of the Sen (1976) contribution which explicitly designed the transfer principle into the construction of the poverty measure. Let x P be the income distribution among the poor so that I Gini (x P ) represents inequality among the poor. Then the Sen index can be represented as
The contour map can be found by replacing the inverted triangles in Figure  16 by hexagonal shapes (Cf Figures 5 (b) and 7 in the case of inequality). Of course one could go further and replace the contours in Figure 16 with contours derived from some alternative principles: for example we might wish to invoke social-welfare principles similar to those invoked in section 4.1 for inequality Donaldson 1980a, Chakravarty 1983 ) but it is not clear how much additional insight is to be obtained over the basic FGT structure (45).
Inequality and Poverty: ranking
Section 2.3 briefly introduced the idea of ranking (in contrast to ordering) as a measurement concept. Let us now see why a tool that may yield an ambiguous answer can still be useful as a method of comparing income distributions. The key idea is that of distributional dominance which can take a variety of forms, discussed in section 6.2; 24 first let us consider the common thread of analysis.
A meta-analysis
There are several ranking approaches that are of potential interest in studying inequality and poverty. For this reason it is useful to consider a meta analysis that will enable us to see how any particular ranking argument may be used. Suppose that for each person i in the distribution we define some concept of individual status q i which may depend on i's own income, on the rest of the distribution and possibly on other information. Then consider the problem of comparing two distributions with associated status vectors (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) and (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) for a population of size n. A natural way of doing this is to introduce the idea of dominance: given the definition of status we say that (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) dominates (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) if it is true that (n) and for at least one person q (i) > q (i) , where the subscript (1) denotes the person with the lowest income, (2) denotes the person with the second smallest income, and so on. Notice that the each status vector is separately arranged according to income to carry out this comparison: so if one income vector were formed just by rearranging the components of the other, the two resulting status vectors would be regarded as equivalent.
A typical way of checking for dominance is to draw a graph of q (k) against k n for two distributions in a population of size n. Clearly this defines a set of n points rather than a curve; so the convention is to define an extra starting point 0, q (where q is the smallest possible value of status, often assumed to be zero) 25 and to plot the n + 1 points (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 , ..., A n ) given by
connected by straight lines. Comparing the curves for (q 1 , ..., q n ) and (q 1 , ..., q n ) immediately reveals whether or not there is dominance. If the distributions being compared really do have the same population then the above graphing convention is just a convention; but if the status vectors being compared are from different-sized populations then the connected curves are often important in checking whether or not there is dominance.
Thus far the dominance definition and its associated graph is devoid of interpretation. But this immediately acquires importance once we plug into (48) different versions of status with associated meanings in terms of inequality, social welfare and poverty. Then (48) acts as a graph template for different dominance concepts associated with important results in the literature. In section 6.2 we examine the principal dominance concepts that are useful in the inequalitymeasurement and poverty-measurement problems and then in section 6.3 we examine the results associated with these concepts.
First and second order dominance
Dominance criteria are widely known from the literature on risk taking where they are usually usually known as stochastic dominance criteria. In the analysis of income distributions no uncertainty is involved (so the "stochastic" is superfluous) and involve applications in the context of inequality and poverty.
First-order dominance.
Perhaps the simplest application is to associate each person's status with his/her income so that, for i = 1, 2, ..., n:
Here the q values are simply the quantiles of the distribution -so if i/n = 0.25 then q (i) is the lower quartile, if i/n = 0.50 then q (i) is the median and so on. Plugging this into (48) gives Pen's (1974) Parade diagram which, because we have sorted the x-values into ascending order, must be an upward sloping graph.
We can use the Parade to give us a simple and fairly intuitive result on welfare: if x quantile-dominates x then we must have W (x) > W (x ) for any monotonic social-welfare function W (Saposnik 1981 (Saposnik , 1983 ; we can also obtain from the quantiles a number of intuitive indices that have been used to characterise the spread of distributions, such as the interquartile range, the 90-10 ratio and so on. However, these first-order concepts do not conform to the key axioms outlined in section 3.1; the principal contributions to the theory of inequality measurement come from the concept of second-order dominance.
Second-order dominance.
Let us first introduce the idea of a normalised income cumulation, where one sums the first k incomes in ascending order, x (1) + x (2) + ... + x (k) , and then divides by the population size:
In this case we associate status with income cumulation. By setting A 0 = (0, 0) and q (k) = c k in the template graph (48) we obtain the so-called Generalised Lorenz curves (GLC). Because the x-values are arranged in ascending order (so that one is adding into the sum in (49) ever larger incomes as k increases) the GLC must be a convex curve. Also, by definition, c n = µ (x). Second-order dominance has a great significance for a number of results on social welfare, inequality comparisons and poverty comparisons which are discussed in section 6.3. Some of these results follow from simple extensions of the basic second-order dominance concept which we will review first.
Extensions of second-order dominance.
Associated with the GLC are a number of related concepts that are widely used in the income-distribution literature.
• (Relative) Lorenz Curves. If we divide the income cumulations by the population mean µ (x) we get the income shares
More precisely s k is the share in total income of the bottom 100k/n percent of the population. Plugging the shares (50) into the graph template (48) yields a persuasive pictorial representation of income distribution, the Lorenz curve (the "Relative" tag is sometimes added to distinguish it from Generalised and Absolute Lorenz curves). The Lorenz or shares Figure 17 (a) , an increasing, convex curve from (0,0) to (1,1); if the curve for distribution x lies everywhere above that for x then it is clear that the income-share of the bottom 10 percent, the bottom 20 percent... of the population is higher in x than in x, so that x appears unambiguously more equal than x; the limiting case of perfect equality is represented by the diagonal line.
There is a potential problem with negative incomes: if there are just a few negative values so that we still have µ (x) > 0 then the Lorenz curve looks like Figure 17 (b) ; if there are so many negative incomes that µ (x) < 0 then the Lorenz curve bends "the wrong way" as in Figure 17 (c); and if µ (x) = 0 the Lorenz curve is undefined (Amiel et al. 1996) .
• Absolute Lorenz curves. In this case the counterpart to (50) is the absolute Lorenz curve (ALC). For this we let
in the graph template. It is clear that, in contrast to the relative Lorenz curve, the resulting convex curve starts from (0,0), dips below the horizontal axis and ends at (1,0). The ALC is a particularly convenient tool for comparing distributions where a large proportion of the incomes are negative.
• Cumulative Complaint Contours. In the context of the reference-point approach to inequality measurement, the Cumulative Complaint Contour (CCC) can be used to provide a visual representation of distance-based "Temkin" inequality. Using the definition of complaint or distance in (19) calculate the cumulative complaints:
Putting q (k) = D k in the template (48) we obtain the CCC. It is clear that this is an increasing concave curve because the ordering by income ensures that the largest distances are included first in the sum (52).
• TIP curves. The discussion in section 5 focused on three aspects of poverty that can be summarised as the Three "I"s of Poverty (Jenkins and Lambert 1997) : Incidence (as indicated by the headcount ratio), Intensity (as indicated by the average income gap) and Inequality among the poor. These three features are evident if we construct cumulative poverty gaps in the same way as we constructed income cumulations in (49), namely G k := 1 n k i=1 g i , k = 1, 2, ..., n.
where g i = max z − x (i) , 0 . Setting q (k) = G k in the template (48) we obtain the TIP curve. This is a concave curve (for the same reason as given for the CCC) and is increasing up k * , the first value of k such that g k = 0, and constant thereafter; k * /n is the headcount ratio (the Incidence component of the TIP); G k * is the (non-normalised) average income gap (the Intensity component) and the curvature of the TIP represents the Inequality of the income gaps.
We now turn to the results that can be obtained from each of these graphs.
Significance for welfare, inequality and poverty
Welfare and distributional rankings.
To show how the second-order dominance criteria can be interpreted in terms of social welfare we need to do a small adaptation to the statement of Axiom 3 in order to obtain a welfare version of this principle -just substitute the expression "W (x) > W (x )" for "I (x) < I (x )" in the statement of Axiom 3. The first key result, originally formulated by Atkinson (1970) , links Lorenz curves and SWFs that satisfy the key principle of inequality measurement: 26
Theorem 5 For any x, x ∈ X n (µ) , x Lorenz-dominates x if and only if W (x) > W (x ) for all welfare functions satisfying the transfer principle.
So the Lorenz curve is intimately connected with welfare judgments that respect the transfer principle. However, it may be regarded as a weakness that this result restricts attention solely to distributions for which µ (x) = µ (x ): it remains silent on cases where the distributions compared differ in terms of total income.
Our second key result deals with the income-change issue. Recall that we distinguished a number of possibly interesting cases, depicted in Figure 11 . Panel (a) of that figure illustrates the case of monotonicity whereby W (x + dx) > W (x) for any dx > 0. Panel (b) illustrates both the principle of scale growth, whereby W (λx) > W (x) for any λ > 1, and the principle of uniform income growth, whereby W (x+δ1) > W (x) for any δ > 0. Then we may state (Shorrocks 1983 
Inequality and Poverty.
The essential inequality result follows immediately from Theorem 5. We know that a welfare-based inequality measure can be constructed from any SWF using (24) and (27) and the inequality contours and the welfare contours in X n (µ) will be exactly the same. Theorem 5 thus implies that x Lorenz-dominates x if and only if I(x) < I(x ) for all inequality measures satisfying the transfer principle. So, in terms of the hexagon diagrams in Figures 3 and 4 , if x Lorenz-dominates x then x must lie inside the x -hexagon; if the Lorenz curves intersect then we have a situation similar to that in Figure 4 .
The result obtainable for generalised Lorenz dominance (Theorem 6) can be adapted to yield a nice result for the case of reference-point inequality. If x CCC-dominates x then I Temk (x ) > I Temk (x) for all Temkin-type inequality measures based on the BoP reference point and that satisfy the transfer principle (Cowell and Ebert 2004) . A similar result is available for poverty using the TIP curve: if (x , z) TIP-dominates (x, z) then P (x , z ) > P (x, z ) for all poverty measures P that satisfy the population principle (Axiom 2) and the transfer principle for poverty measures and for all z ≤ z (Jenkins and Lambert 1997) . 27
Conclusion
Inequality and poverty measures in common use can be seen to be founded on a relatively small number of principles. In the main these principles accord well with intuition and can be represented using a relatively small number of mathematical functions. In many cases there is a natural interpretation of inequality measures in terms of welfare economics.
